This audit report contains critical security findings that require immediate
attention before production deployment.
Auditor: Claude (Senior Security Auditor)
Scope: Comprehensive security assessment of the MPC vault system for wallet operations
Version: Sonr v0.10.15
Executive Summary
This security audit evaluates the Multi-Party Computation (MPC) vault system implemented in Sonr’s blockchain platform. The audit covers the current architecture, recent security improvements, wallet operation security, threat analysis, and production readiness assessment.Key Findings Overview
- Critical Issues: 3 identified
- High Risk Issues: 4 identified
- Medium Risk Issues: 6 identified
- Low Risk Issues: 8 identified
Overall Security Posture: MODERATE RISK - Suitable for testnet deployment
with immediate remediation of critical issues required before mainnet
deployment with user funds.
1. Current Architecture Analysis
1.1 System Components
The vault system consists of four primary components:Vault Client (internal/vault/vault.go)
Vault Client (internal/vault/vault.go)
Purpose: High-level interface for vault operations using WebAssembly enclavesSecurity Features:
- Input validation framework with regex patterns
- Secure error handling with sanitized messages
- WASM plugin integrity verification via SHA256 hashing
- Restricted host and filesystem access for WASM plugins
WASM Plugin (cmd/vault/main.go)
WASM Plugin (cmd/vault/main.go)
Purpose: WebAssembly-based secure execution environment for MPC operations
Security Features: - Sandboxed execution environment - Rate limiting (60
operations/minute per vault) - Resource constraints (max 100 vaults per
instance) - Ownership-based access control - Configurable IPFS endpoints and
timeouts
DWN Keeper Integration (x/dwn/keeper/keeper.go)
DWN Keeper Integration (x/dwn/keeper/keeper.go)
Purpose: Blockchain state management and vault lifecycle operations
Security Features: - Vault state persistence with enclave data separation
- Integration with DID-based authentication - Service registration verification
MPC Enclave (crypto/mpc/enclave.go)
MPC Enclave (crypto/mpc/enclave.go)
Purpose: Multi-party computation cryptographic operationsSecurity Features:
- AES-GCM encryption for data at rest
- ECDSA signing with SHA3-256 hashing
- Key derivation and rotation capabilities
2. Security Fixes Analysis
2.1 Recently Implemented Security Improvements
Based on code analysis and git history, the following security enhancements have been implemented:WASM Sandbox Restrictions
✅ EFFECTIVE
- Restricted allowed hosts to local IPFS endpoints only
- Limited file system access to
/tmp/vault-wasmdirectory - Well-implemented defense against WASM plugin abuse
Input Validation Framework
✅ EFFECTIVE - Vault ID validation with alphanumeric constraints - CID
validation with Base58 format checking - Password validation with UTF-8 and
size constraints - Comprehensive validation prevents injection attacks
Error Message Sanitization
✅ EFFECTIVE - SecureError type with public/internal error separation -
Structured error codes prevent information leakage - Prevents sensitive
information disclosure
Rate Limiting and Resource Constraints
✅ EFFECTIVE - 60 ops/minute per vault, max 100 vaults per instance -
Protection against resource exhaustion attacks - Well-implemented DoS
protection
Plugin Integrity Verification
⚠️ PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE - Optional SHA256 hash verification - Defaults to
empty hash (backward compatibility) - Good foundation but needs enforcement in
production
Access Control Implementation
⚠️ NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
- Owner-based access with pseudo-authentication
- Uses vault ID as owner ID (placeholder implementation)
- Insufficient for production use
3. Wallet Operation Security Assessment
Vault Generation and Key Derivation
Vault Generation and Key Derivation
- Strength: Uses secure MPC protocol for key generation
- Weakness: No entropy source verification
- Risk Level: Medium
- CVSS Score: 5.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)
Transaction Signing (Cosmos, EVM)
Transaction Signing (Cosmos, EVM)
- Strength: Proper ECDSA implementation with SHA3-256 - Weakness: Missing signature malleability protection - Risk Level: Medium - CVSS Score: 4.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)
Message Signing and Verification
Message Signing and Verification
- Strength: Standard ECDSA verification process - Weakness: No timestamp validation for replay protection - Risk Level: Medium - CVSS Score: 5.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)
Key Rotation and Vault Management
Key Rotation and Vault Management
- Strength: MPC refresh protocol for key rotation - Weakness: No automated rotation enforcement - Risk Level: Low - CVSS Score: 3.7 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)
IPFS Storage and Retrieval
IPFS Storage and Retrieval
- Strength: AES-GCM encryption for data at rest
- Weakness: No integrity verification after retrieval
- Risk Level: High
- CVSS Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
4. Threat Analysis by Risk Level
4.1 CRITICAL Vulnerabilities (Immediate Action Required)
These vulnerabilities require immediate remediation before any production
deployment.
CRITICAL-001: Weak Authentication System
CRITICAL-001: Weak Authentication System
- Location:
cmd/vault/main.go:647-676 - Issue: Pseudo-authentication using vault ID as owner ID
- Impact: Complete vault takeover by any user knowing vault ID
- CVSS Score: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- Remediation: Implement proper JWT/OAuth2 authentication with cryptographic proofs
CRITICAL-002: Missing WASM Integrity Enforcement
CRITICAL-002: Missing WASM Integrity Enforcement
- Location:
internal/vault/vault.go:138- Issue: WASM hash verification disabled by default (empty ExpectedSHA256) - Impact: Malicious WASM plugin execution - CVSS Score: 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N) - Remediation: Enforce mandatory WASM integrity checks in production
CRITICAL-003: Hardcoded Default Passwords
CRITICAL-003: Hardcoded Default Passwords
- Location:
x/dwn/keeper/keeper.go:404 - Issue: Default password generation based on predictable values
- Impact: Vault encryption key compromise
- CVSS Score: 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- Remediation: Implement secure password derivation or user-provided passwords
4.2 HIGH Risk Vulnerabilities
HIGH-001: No Encrypted Data Integrity Verification
HIGH-001: No Encrypted Data Integrity Verification
- Location:
crypto/mpc/enclave.go:51-68 - Issue: No HMAC or authenticated encryption verification after IPFS retrieval
- Impact: Data tampering attacks on stored vault data
- CVSS Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
HIGH-002: Missing Signature Malleability Protection
HIGH-002: Missing Signature Malleability Protection
- Location:
crypto/mpc/enclave.go:111-121- Issue: ECDSA signatures vulnerable to malleability attacks - Impact: Transaction replay with modified signatures - CVSS Score: 7.4 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
HIGH-003: Insufficient Input Sanitization for IPFS Operations
HIGH-003: Insufficient Input Sanitization for IPFS Operations
- Location:
cmd/vault/main.go:321-392- Issue: Direct CID usage without additional validation - Impact: IPFS injection attacks or resource exhaustion - CVSS Score: 7.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
HIGH-004: Race Conditions in Concurrent Vault Access
HIGH-004: Race Conditions in Concurrent Vault Access
- Location:
cmd/vault/main.go:505-568 - Issue: Inadequate synchronization for concurrent vault operations
- Impact: Data corruption or inconsistent vault state
- CVSS Score: 6.8 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
4.3 MEDIUM Risk Vulnerabilities
MEDIUM-001: Weak Key Derivation for Encryption
MEDIUM-001: Weak Key Derivation for Encryption
- Location:
crypto/mpc/enclave.go:78 - CVSS Score: 5.9 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
MEDIUM-002: Missing Request Replay Protection
MEDIUM-002: Missing Request Replay Protection
- Location: Various signing functions - CVSS Score: 5.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)
MEDIUM-003: Insufficient Error Context in Logs
MEDIUM-003: Insufficient Error Context in Logs
- Location: Throughout codebase - CVSS Score: 4.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)
MEDIUM-004: No Key Rotation Enforcement
MEDIUM-004: No Key Rotation Enforcement
- Location:
cmd/vault/main.go:986-988- CVSS Score: 4.2 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)
MEDIUM-005: WebAuthn Implementation Placeholder
MEDIUM-005: WebAuthn Implementation Placeholder
- Location:
cmd/vault/main.go:947-954- CVSS Score: 5.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)
MEDIUM-006: Insufficient Resource Cleanup
MEDIUM-006: Insufficient Resource Cleanup
- Location:
cmd/vault/main.go:976-983 - CVSS Score: 4.9 (AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)
4.4 LOW Risk Issues
Low Risk Issues Summary
Low Risk Issues Summary
- LOW-001: Predictable Enclave ID Generation - LOW-002: Missing Rate Limit Bypass Protection - LOW-003: Insufficient Logging for Security Events - LOW-004: No Vault Backup/Recovery Mechanism - LOW-005: Missing Health Check Attestation Validation - LOW-006: Hardcoded Configuration Values - LOW-007: No Circuit Breaker for IPFS Operations - LOW-008: Missing Input Length Validation Edge Cases
5. Production Readiness Assessment
Testnet Deployment
⚠️ CONDITIONAL APPROVALSuitable with immediate critical fixes:
- Fix CRITICAL-001 (Authentication)
- Fix CRITICAL-002 (WASM Integrity)
- Fix CRITICAL-003 (Default Passwords)
Mainnet with User Funds
❌ NOT RECOMMENDED Requires comprehensive security hardening: - All
CRITICAL and HIGH issues resolved - External security audit by certified firm
- Bug bounty program - Comprehensive monitoring and alerting Timeline: 3-4 months minimum
Enterprise/Institutional Use
❌ NOT RECOMMENDEDRequires enterprise-grade security controls:
- SOC 2 Type II compliance
- Multi-signature authorization workflows
- Hardware Security Module (HSM) integration
- Advanced threat detection and response
6. Remediation Recommendations
6.1 Immediate Actions (0-2 weeks)
1
Implement Proper Authentication System
- Replace pseudo-authentication with JWT/OAuth2
- Add cryptographic proof of vault ownership
- Implement session management with timeout
2
Enforce WASM Integrity Verification
- Remove backward compatibility for empty hashes - Implement automatic hash verification - Add WASM signature verification
3
Replace Hardcoded Password Generation
- Implement secure key derivation functions (PBKDF2/Argon2)
- Add user-provided password support
- Implement password strength requirements
6.2 Short-term Actions (2-8 weeks)
1
Add Data Integrity Verification
- Implement HMAC for IPFS stored data
- Add checksum verification after retrieval
- Implement authenticated encryption (AES-GCM with additional data)
2
Implement Signature Malleability Protection
- Use deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979) - Add signature canonicalization - Implement proper nonce generation
3
Enhance WebAuthn Integration
- Complete WebAuthn assertion verification
- Add biometric authentication support
- Implement proper challenge-response flow
7. Implementation Timeline
Phase 1: Critical Security Fixes (2-3 weeks)
Phase 1: Critical Security Fixes (2-3 weeks)
- Authentication system implementation
- WASM integrity enforcement
- Password security enhancement
- Basic monitoring setup
Phase 2: High-Risk Remediation (4-6 weeks)
Phase 2: High-Risk Remediation (4-6 weeks)
- Data integrity verification - Signature security improvements - Input validation enhancements - Concurrent access protection
Phase 3: Production Hardening (8-12 weeks)
Phase 3: Production Hardening (8-12 weeks)
- Comprehensive monitoring implementation - Advanced security controls - Performance optimization - External security audit preparation
Phase 4: Enterprise Readiness (6-8 months)
Phase 4: Enterprise Readiness (6-8 months)
- Compliance framework implementation
- Advanced threat protection
- HSM integration
- Comprehensive testing and validation
8. Compliance and Standards Assessment
8.1 Current Compliance Status
OWASP Top 10
❌ Multiple violations identified
NIST Cybersecurity Framework
❌ Partial implementation
ISO 27001
❌ Insufficient security controls
SOC 2
❌ Not compliant
8.2 Recommended Standards Implementation
- Implement OWASP secure coding practices
- Adopt NIST cybersecurity framework controls
- Prepare for SOC 2 Type II audit
- Consider ISO 27001 certification for enterprise use
9. Conclusion
The Sonr MPC vault system demonstrates good architectural principles and has implemented several important security improvements. However, critical vulnerabilities prevent immediate production deployment with user funds.The system is suitable for testnet deployment with immediate remediation of
the three critical issues identified. A comprehensive security hardening
effort over 3-4 months is required before mainnet deployment with user funds
is recommended.
Immediate Priority: Address the three critical vulnerabilities before any
production deployment.
Report Prepared By: Claude (Senior Security Auditor)
Date: August 5, 2025
Classification: Confidential - Internal Use Only